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MUL TIPERIOD PRODUCTION WITH FORWARD AND OPTION MARKETS 
Abstract 
Production and hedging in both forward and options markets are analyzed for forward-
looking fmns that maximize expected utility. In the presence of unbiased forward and options 
prices, it is shown that such firms will use options as hedging instruments. This result contrasts 
with the conclusions from studies that assume myopic behavior, and occurs because forward-
looking agents care about the effect of future output prices on profits from future production 
cycles. Simulations support the theoretical results and show how the introduction of an options 
market influences the optimal forward position. 
I 
MUL TIPERIOD PRODUCTION WITH FORWARD AND OPTIONS MARKETS 
Most of the literature on risk aversion and price uncertainty has incorporated Sandmo's 
implicit assumption that the firm is concerned with a single production cycle. This convention has 
been extended into the hedging literature (e.g., Holthausen; Feder, Just, and Schmitz; Anderson 
and Danthine 1980; Losq; Batlin; Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha; Smith and Stulz; Paroush and 
Wolf; Kerkvliet and Moffett). However, output price changes that occur in one period will change 
price expectations for subsequent production periods. In addition, for industries with at least one 
fixed input, output supply changes will cause changes in input prices and optimal input use for 
subsequent production cycles. Firms operating and hedging in this environment will presumably 
have noticed the effects of changes in this period's price on next period's profitability and adjusted 
their hedging behavior accordingly. 
This paper extends the number of production cycles to two and shows how optimal 
hedging depends on the perceived relationships between this period's output price and next 
period's input and output prices.! We focus on forward rather than futures markets to show that 
the main results do not depend on the existence of basis risk, and also to avoid the complexities 
that arise from the presence of basis risk. In addition, we extend the model to incorporate options 
and show a valid role for options as hedging instruments that has here-to-fore been lacking in the 
one-period hedging models (Lapan, Moschini and Hanson; Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam). The 
analysis by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson reveals that myopic firms with nonstochastic production 
will use options only if futures and/or options prices are biased. Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam 
showed that production uncertainty will lead myopic fmns to use options for hedging purposes. In 
this paper, we will show that options are used for hedging even if production is nonstochastic and 
prices are unbiased, as long as firms exhibit forward-looking behavior. 
!Anderson and Danthine (1983), Hey, and Karp also analyzed dynamic hedging. Our model differs from that 
of Anderson and Danthine (1983) in that they considered hedging revisions within a single production cycle. It 
differs from that of Hey in that he assumed that prices were independently distributed and that agents had 
intertemporally additive utility functions. Karp's basic model is similar to that of Anderson and Danthine (1983), 
with the addition of stochastic production. None of these references includes options. 
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The first section of this paper develops the optimal options and forward positions for a finn 
that will be in operation for two periods. It is shown that the hedging decision made at the 
beginning of the first period will incorporate the effect of the first period's price changes on both 
the first and second periods' profits. The second period effect is caused by the impact of the fust 
period price on expected input and output prices for the second period. One of the more interesting 
aspects of this second period effect is that the fust period price will almost always have a nonlinear 
relationship with the profits from the second production cycle. Because the payoff from forward 
contracts is linear in prices, it is therefore not possible to fully hedge with forward contracts against 
this nonlinear relationship. Options offer a more flexible way of hedging against this nonlinearity 
and consequently options are shown to have a hedging role. The derivation of the optimal options 
position is complex because options truncate the distribution of expected returns. This derivation 
is the subject of the second section. In the third section, we perform simulations to calculate the 
expected-utility-maximizing forward and options positions for individuals with constant absolute 
risk aversion. These optimal positions are shown to depend on the characteristics of the utility and 
the production functions, and on the expected correlation among the first period's output prices and 
the second period's input and forward prices. These simulations are performed for an individual 
who has access to both forward and options markets and to a forward market alone. 
The Theoretical Model 
Consider a decision maker characterized by a twice differentiable utility function of tenninal 
wealth U(Wy) such that U' > 0 and U" < 0. Tenninal wealth is defined as initial wealth at the 
current date plus the cash flows arising up to and including the terminal date:2 
2To simplify the exposition. interest rates are omitted in (1.1). The omission does not affect in any 
meaningful way the main conclusions of the study, as long as interest rates are nonstochastic and there are no 
constraints regarding the amounts of money that can be borrowed or lent at the prevailing interest mte. 
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where W, denotes monetary wealth at the end of trading date t and c, is cash flow at time t. 
The agent can produce output Q, from input I,_ 1 by means of the transformation function 
Q, = q(I,_1), where qO is such that q' > 0, q" < 0, q(O) = 0, and q'(O) --+ oo.3 The time subscripts 
indicate that it takes one production cycle (from t-1 to t) to transform input into output. Production 
is assumed to be nonstochastic to emphasize that the role of options as hedging instruments is not 
due to production uncertainty (Sakong, Hayes, and Hallam). 
It is also assumed that the agent has access to forward and options markets for the final 
good. Only forward and put markets are considered, however, because any combination of 
forward, put, and call contracts can be replicated by any two of these financial instruments. To see 
why this assertion is true, examine the upper panel of Figure 1. This position diagram shows the 
payoff to an investor who has written a put (dashed line) and who has sold a forward contract 
(solid line). The addition of the two payoffs (i.e., the sum of the vertical distances from the 
horizontal axis) yields the net payoff shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. This net position is 
identical to the payoff of a written call. In fact, any two of forward, put, and call contracts can be 
used to replicate the third. This allows us to ignore calls in the analysis that follows without 
precluding call-like solutions. 
At date t, the individual sells X, forward contracts for delivery at t+ 1 at the forward price 
F,. At date t+ 1, the individual repurchases the X, forward contracts at the prevailing cash price 
Pt+l' The cash flow from these two operations in the forward market occurs at date t+ 1 and is 
equal to [(F,- Pt+l) X,]. Similarly, the agent at date t buys z, puts with strike price F, at a price 
Rt' and at t+ 1 obtains a revenue of zero if Pt+l exceeds the strike price F,, or a gain of 
[(F,- P,+1) Z,J otherwise.4 Given this setting, the cash flow at each decision date is given by 
(1.2) c, = P, Q, + (F,_ 1 - P,) X,_1 - R, z, + (F,_ 1 - P,) L, z,_ 1 - H, I, 
3These conditions on qO are standard assumptions in production models. These conditions are useful 
because in most scenarios they rule out the possibility of negative input demand. 
4Note that x, < 0 (Z, < 0) means that the agent is buying forward (selling put) contracts at date t. 
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Figure 1. Payoff diagrams for short forward, short put, and short call positions. 
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a. Payoff diagram for short forward and short put positions. 
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+ 
-- short call position 
b. Payoff diagram for short call position (equal to sum of short forward and short put positions). 
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where H, denotes input price, and L, is a binary variable such that L, = 1 when the put option 
finishes in the money (F,_1 > P,) and L, = 0 when the put option finishes at or out of the money 
(F,_ 1 ~ P,). 
Because our purpose is to explore the consequences of relaxing the assumption of a single 
production cycle, and because a two-production cycle model captures the essentials, we limit the 
discussion to the two-cycle case. Denote the current decision date by t = 1, the next decision date 
by t = 2, and the terminal date (T) by t = 3. The optimal decisions regarding input, and forward 
and put positions at the current date t = 1 (i.e., I1, X1, and Z1) must solve the following set of 
recursive equations: 
where: p, = (P,, H,, F,, R,), 
J2., = CPa····· p,). 
E,(·) denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, the matrix Jl, comprises 
the cash, forward, and put prices up to (and including) time t, and cash flows are given by (1.2). 
Equations (1.3) through (1.5) tell us that the decision maker at the current decision date chooses 
the levels of input, puts, and forward contracts that maximize expected utility over the entire 
planning horizon, assuming that the future levels of input, forward contracts, and puts will be 
chosen so as to maximize expected utility over the rest of the planning horizon. 
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The optimizing levels of forward contracts and puts at the current date are obtained by 
starting at the terminal date and working backwards. Simple inspection of (1.3) indicates that the 
value of I3 that maximizes UO is zero (I3 * = 0) because UO is a strictly decreasing function of 
I3 and I3 cannot be negative. Substituting I3 * = 0 into the expression for terminal wealth yields 
At date 2, the optimum levels of input (I2 *), puts (Zz *), and forward contracts (X2 *) must 
satisfy the following necessary first order conditions (FOCs) 
(1.7) 
(1.8) 
(1.9) 
where M3' denotes U' evaluated at I3 *, I2*, Zz*, and X2*. Combining (1.7) and (1.8), we get 
F2 q'(I2 *) = H2, which means that the optimal level of input (and therefore of production) is 
determined separately from the optimal number of puts and forward contracts. The optimal input 
demand at date 2 is a function of the ratio of input and forward prices only, i.e., I2* = q'-l(Hjf2), 
where q'-1 is the inverse function of q'5 
It can be inferred that the decision problem at date 2 represents the standard myopic or static 
decision problem. Only one production cycle remains at date 2; therefore, the decision maker 
behaves as if he or she were to stop producing at the end of the current cycle. This myopic model 
has been extensively used in studying optimal production and hedging behavior; in particular, the 
case of production in the presence of futures and options has been recently analyzed by Lapan, 
5The inverse function q'- 1 exists because q" < 0 by assumption. 
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Moschini, and Hanson. Perhaps the most important (and striking) result obtained by these authors 
is that options are not used as hedging instruments if both forward and options prices are unbiased 
{i.e., EiP3) = F2 and E2[(F2 - P3) L3] = ~). Under unbiasedness, the optimal decisions are 
given by I2 * = q'·1(Hz1F2), Z2* = 0, and X2* = Q3 • [ = q(I2*)], independently of the degree of risk 
aversion and the initial wealth. 
One of the purposes of this study is to show that, in contrast with the myopic case, options 
are generally useful hedging instruments for forward-looking decision makers even if both forward 
and options prices are unbiased. The optimal amount of puts bought by a myopic decision maker 
is generally nonzero when prices are biased; hence, to demonstrate that our results are driven by 
forward-looking behavior rather than biased prices we will assume throughout that prices are 
unbiased {i.e., E,(P,+1) = F, and E,[(F,- P,+1) L,+1] = R,).6 Then, substituting I1*, I/. Z/. and 
X2* under unbiased forward and options prices in the expression for terminal wealth (1.1) we get 
The term n represents the profits arising from optimal behavior in the second production cycle; n 
is nonnegative because it is zero if I2 • = 0 and strictly positive if I2 • > 0. 
Finally, the necessary FOCs for optimality at the current date t = 1 are 
6We assume that markets are unbiased throughout the paper because we are interested in hedging behavior. 
Any changes from the optimal positions caused by the introduction of biased markets would be speculative by 
definition. Therefore. we learn nothing about hedging behavior by introducing biased markets. 
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(1.13) 
where M2' denotes U' evaluated at I3*, I2*, Z2*, X2*, I1*, Z1*, and X1*. As it was the case for 
the myopic scenario (t = 2), the optimal input level for the forward-looking finn is detennined 
separately from the optimal levels of puts and forward contracts. Optimal input demand at date 1 is 
given by I1* = q'-l(H/F 1). 
To characterize the optimal forward and put positions, it is helpful to express FOCs (1.12) 
and (1.13) as (1.12') and (1.13'), respectively:? 
(1.12') 
(1.13') 
where Cov1(·) denotes the covariance operator, given information at date t. Evaluate now 
Cov 1(P2, M3') and Cov 1[(F 1 - P2) L2, M3'] at the levels that would be optimal if the firm were 
myopic, that is, selling forward the entire output {X1 = Q2* [ = q(I1*)]} and buying zero puts 
(Z1 = 0). Plugging these values in (1.10) yields W3 = W0 + c1 + F1 Q2* + n. This means that, in 
general, X1 = Q2* [ = q(I1*)] and Z1 = 0 are the optimal forward and put positions only if IT and P2 
are independently distributed. If IT and P 2 are not independent, setting X1 = Q2 • and Z1 = 0 
generally will not render M3' and P2 independent, and consequently Cov 1 (P2, M3') "¢' 0 and 
Cov1[(F1 - P2) L2, M3'] "¢' 0. Hence, X 1 = Q2* and Z1 = 0 are not optimal because the necessary 
FOCs (1.12') and (1.13') do not hold for such values ofX1 and Z1. The myopic case, which is 
the assumption upon which much of the literature is based, can be obtained by setting IT= 0 and 
can therefore be viewed as a special case of the model presented here. The direction and magnitude 
to which X1* differs from Q2 • and Z1* differs from zero in the more realistic scenario where IT and 
P 2 are not independent is the focus of the following sections. 
7Recallthat E(x y) = Cov(x, y) + E(x) E(y) for any pair of random variables x andy. 
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The Role of Options as Hedging Instruments for Forward-Looking Producers 
Inspection of n =o F2 q(I/) · H2 I2• reveals that the only way for nand Pz to be 
independent is the very unrealistic instance in which both F2 and Hz are independently distributed 
from P 2. Thus, the key is whether at time one the agent believes that output price is related to input 
or forward prices at date two. Any price shock that is not viewed as transitory will change 
expected cash and forward prices at subsequent periods. Input prices at date twill respond to 
changes in output prices at date t-1 if input supply is other than perfectly elastic and if output prices 
at date t-1 alter optimal production at date t for at least a subset of producers. Producers who 
belong to this subset may, for example, bid up input prices because they view an output price 
increase as permanent or because higher output prices create more liquidity and allow them to 
expand production. For our purposes, it does not matter whether this input price response is 
caused by rational behavior, but only that the decision maker believes it may occur. 
Assume that Fz and Hz are each a differentiable function of P 2 and of other random 
variable independent of P z• i.e., 
(2.1) Fz = F(P2, f) 
(2.2) H2 = H(Pz, h) 
where f and h are random variables with finite variances. The random variables f and h are 
possibly related to each other but they are independent of P 2. Let g(P z) be the expectation of M2' 
over f and h, i.e., g(P2) =o E1(M2'1P2), where the notation g(P2) emphasizes that P2 is the only 
random variable affecting the function g(·). Then, FOCs (1.12) and (1.13) can be rewritten as 
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Given the assumptions of the model, g(P 0 ) is continuous and differentiable everywhere except at 
P2 = F1, at which it is continuous but not differentiable if Z1* ;e 0. Under these conditions, it is 
possible to apply the Mean-Value Theorem to prove the following Proposition. 
PROPOSffiON. Assume that forward output prices and input cash prices behave as in (2.1) and 
(2 .2 ). Then, the forward-looking firm under unbiased forward and put prices will find it optimal 
to use puts as hedging instruments and to establish a forward position different from short selling 
total output. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
This Proposition is important because it reveals that key results previously reported 
regarding optimal hedging behavior (i.e., optimality of a null position in options coupled with 
forward full hedging under unbiased prices) are due to the assumption of myopic behavior. 
Moreover, whether decision makers are forward-looking or myopic can be (at least conceptually) 
tested empirically because their behavioral differences are observable. 
The reason for resorting to a nonstandard technique (i.e., the Mean-Value Theorem) to 
prove the above Proposition is as follows. If n and P 2 were independently distributed, the optimal 
forward and put positions would be X1* =.Q2* and Z/ = 0, and the graph of g(P2) would look 
like the horizontal line in Figure 2. In contrast, when nand P 2 are not independent the optimal 
forward and put positions are X1* ;e Q2 * and Z1* ;e 0 (see Proposition), and the graph of g(P 2) 
looks something like the dashed line in Figure 2. If n and P 2 are not independent, the function 
g(P2) is differentiable everywhere except where P2 equals the strike price F1. Moreover, the 
function g(P2) need not be concave or convex on either side of F1 for the Proposition to hold. 
As we already discussed, whether the optimal combination of forward and put contracts is 
(X 1* = Q2 *, Z1* = 0) or (X 1* ;e Q 2*, Z1* ;e 0) depends on whether n and P 2 are independently 
Figure 2. Graph of the function g(P 2). 
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distributed or not. If forward and input cash prices behave as in (2.1) and (2.2), the first 
derivative of n with respect to P2 iss 
(2.5) 
Clearly, the sign of Cli1/ilP2 is ambiguous. Assuming that ()2Fz1ClP22 = ()2Hz1ilP/ = 0 (i.e., that 
forward and input prices are linearly related to contemporaneous output prices), the second 
derivative of n with respect to p 2 is9 
(2.6) 
(2.6') 
ilF0 
= [q'(I *) --
2 ilPz 
The second derivative ()2I1J()p / is nonnegative because q" < 0 by assumption. This assumption 
means that there are decreasing returns to scale, which is the most realistic scenario because fmns 
under perfect competition will only produce at a point at which q" < 0. The linear relationship 
between output prices and payoff in the myopic model exists because production levels and costs 
are predetennined. When we introduce a second relevant production cycle, the convexity of the 
profit function re-emerges. 
Figure 3 depicts the range of possible impacts of next period output price (P 2) on the 
profits from the next production cycle (0), assuming that ()2I1JilPl is strictly positive. Figure 3 
also shows schematically how options and forward contracts can be used to hedge the additional 
risk attributable to the next production cycle. It can be seen that n is nonnegative and that the 
relationship between nand P 2 is nonlinear. Options allow producers to create hedged positions 
8Note that F2 q'(l;l ~ H, from the FOCs corresponding to date t ~ 2 [see discussion following FOCs (1.7) 
through (1.9)]. 
9The expression for ai;;aP2 can be obtained by differentiating F2 q'(l2•) ~ H, with respect to P2 and 
solving for oi2'/oP2, which yields oi2·;aP2 ~- [q'(l2") oF/oP2 - oH/oP2]/[F2 q"(l2")]. 
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Figure 3. Profits from the second production cycle (TI) and payoffs from combined forward-put 
positions (XZ) as functions of output cash prices at date t = 2. 
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with kinked payoffs. This kink allows producers to better hedge the additional risk than the linear 
forward position. It is clear from Figure 3 that to hedge the additional risk attributable to the next 
production cycle, the agent will sell puts if ClfVCJP2 < 0, and sell puts and forward contracts (which 
is equivalent to selling calls) if ClfVCJP z > 0. It is also clear that if options are not available, the 
forward-looking flrm will sell forward more (less) than its entire production if ClfVCJPz < (>) 0. 
In order to flnd the relative size of the optimal forward and put positions, it is necessary to 
specify the utility function (U), the production function (q), and the relationships between Pz and 
Fz and Hz [i.e., Fz = F(P2, f) and H2 = H(P2, h)]. The next section presents simulated examples 
that show how the optimal forward and put positions respond to some of the parameters 
characterizing U, q, F2 = F(P2, f), and Hz= H(P2, h). 
Numerical Simulations 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of numerical simulations regarding the 
theoretical Proposition derived previously. Although these simulations correspond to particular 
scenarios, they are helpful in assessing the orders of magnitude of the forward and options 
positions involved. 
The simulations are performed assuming that the decision maker is constant absolute risk 
averse (CARA), i.e., 
(3.1) U =- exp(- A W3) 
where A is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and that forward and input prices are linearly 
related to output cash prices, 
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where P2 n.i.d. (f1, crp2), f n.i.d. (0, cr?J, and h n.i.d. (0, crh2). To be as unrestrictive as possible 
while maintaining tractability, a second-order Taylor expansion of I1 [II = F2 q(l:I *) - H2 Iz', 
I2* = q'-1(H2/F2)] around the means of the random variables P2, f, and his used instead of 
assuming a particular production function (q), i.e., 
A A A 
+ (P2 - ll) f I1p1 + (P2 - ll) h I1Ph + f h Ilfh 
where the symbol represents variables measured at the means (P2 = f1, f = 0, h = 0), and the 
subscripts along with I1 denote the derivatives of I1 with respect to the respective random variables. 
The optimal forward and put positions can be calculated after (i) substituting expression 
(3.4) into (1.10) and the resulting expression into the utility function (3.1), (ii) calculating the 
expected utility over the random variables P 2, f, and h, and (iii) finding the combination of 
decision variables that maximizes the expected utility. At stage (ii), the combined assumption of 
CARA utility and normally distributed random variables coupled with the second-order Taylor 
expansion (3.4) proves very helpful because it allows a substantial simplification of the 
calculations. Under these conditions, two out of the three integrals comprised in the expression for 
expected utility have closed-form solutions, thus greatly simplifying the numerical integration.lO 
The simulation exercise can be performed for any decision setting for which the theoretical 
model provides a reasonable approximation. Because of data availability, the particular example 
chosen is the production of fat cattle (Q1+1) from feeder cattle (I1). The decision maker is assumed 
A A 
to be a representative producer, for whom Q3 = 120,000 pounds of fat beef and I2 = 60,000 
A A 
pounds of feeder cattle, where Q3 and I2 equal production and input demand evaluated at the means 
lODetails about the simulations are available from the authors upon request. 
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of the random variables. The output elasticity of factor demand (11Qr) is assumed to equal 0.9, and 
the transformation of feeder cattle to fat cattle is hypothesized to last 8 months. Based on price data 
over the period 1974-1986,11 it is postulated that F1 = ~ = F2 = 70, crp2 = crF2 = 70, and 
crH2 = 250, where prices are expressed in dollars of December 1986 per 100 pounds, and crF2 and 
crH2 denote the variances of F2 and H2, given information at date t = 1. 
Sensitivity analysis was performed for the degree of absolute risk aversion (A.), the 
elasticity of input demand with respect to forward price (TliF), the derivative of input prices with 
respect to output cash prices (1\t), 12 and the relationship between forward and output cash prices 
(~F). 13 When ~F = 0, the underlying hypothesis is that output cash price shocks are transitory, 
i.e., price shocks at a particular date have no effect on prices at later dates. In contrast, ~F = 1 
represents the case in which price shocks at a particular date are permanent because they affect 
prices forever. Note that different values of 1\t and~ imply different values of crh2 and cr? 
because crh 2 = crH2- ~H2 crp2 and cr/ = crF2- ~F2 crp2· 
The results of the simulations are presented in Table 1. The optimal levels of the decision 
variables are expressed in thousands of pounds. Optimal production (Qz') equals 120,000 pounds 
in all instances. Therefore, for a myopic decision maker it would be optimal to sell forward 
120,000 pounds and to have a zero put position. In contrast, a forward-looking agent will find it 
optimal to sell the number of forward contracts reported in the column labeled (X1*1 Z1 = Z1*) and 
to buy the amount of puts indicated in the column labeled (Z1*). The amount of puts bought is 
negative in all instances, which means that the optimal strategy in this example is to sell puts. 
llCash prices used were monthly averages of daily prices corresponding to medium frame one steer calves 
at Kansas City and 900-i,HlO pounds choice slaughter steers at Omaha, reported by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Prices were expressed in real terms by using the Producer Price Index. 
12Empirical estimates of ~H for different months ranged from 1.05 to 1.40 without correcting for 
autocorrelation, and from 0.93 to 1.30 when the correction was imposed. 
13Using futures as proxies for forward prices, we obtained sample estimates of ~F ranging between 0.82 and 
1.07 depending on the month being considered. Futures prices were monthly averages of daily futures prices for live 
cattle at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, reported in the Statistical Yearbook of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
The October contract was used in January and February, the December contract in March and April, the February 
contract in May and June. the April contract in July and August, the June contract in September and October, and the 
August contract in November and December. 
Table I. Optimal decisions at date t = I 
Response of Response of Coefficient of Elast. of Input Optimal Decisions at Date t = 1 (unit: 1,000 Eounds) 
Cash to Forward to Absolute Risk Demand with Production F01ward Contracts Sold in the Puts Bought 
Output Prices Output Prices Aversion Respect to (Q2*) Absence of Presence of (Zt*) 
(~H) (~p) (A) Forward Prices Puts Puts 
(TliF) cx 1*1 z1 = O) (X 1*1 Z 1 = Z 1*) 
0.5 0 0.00003 1 120 92.0 93.0 -2.0 
0.5 0 0.00003 3 120 95.2 97.9 -5.5 
0.5 0 0.00012 1 120 96.6 97.4 -1.7 
0.5 0 0.00012 3 120 103.9 105.8 -3.7 
0.5 1 0.00003 1 120 207.5 214.6 -14.3 
0.5 1 0.00003 3 120 202.9 223.0 -40.2 
0.5 1 0.00012 1 120 200.8 207.4 -13.0 
0.5 1 0.00012 3 120 187.8 203.4 -31.4 
1.0 0 0.00003 1 120 63.5 67.6 -8.3 ~ -..J 
1.0 0 0.00003 3 120 69.5 80.6 -22.3 
1.0 0 0.00012 1 120 72.0 75.6 -7 .I 
1.0 0 0.00012 3 120 86.2 93.9 -15.4 
1.0 1 0.00003 1 120 178.8 181.5 -5.5 
1.0 1 0.00003 3 120 176.6 184.4 -15.6 
1.0 1 0.00012 1 120 175.5 178.1 -5.1 
1.0 1 0.00012 3 120 168.7 175.1 -12.8 
1.5 0 0.00003 1 120 34.2 43.6 -18.8 
1.5 0 0.00003 3 120 41.7 67.5 -51.7 
1.5 0 0.00012 1 120 45.0 53.3 -16.6 
1.5 0 0.00012 3 120 64.4 83.2 -37.7 
1.5 1 0.00003 1 120 149.8 150.2 -0.8 
1.5 1 0.00003 3 120 149.3 150.4 -2.3 
1.5 1 0.00012 1 120 149.1 149.5 -0.8 
1.5 1 0.00012 3 120 147.5 148.6 -2.0 
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Because one can create any desired forward/options payoff with any two contracts of the 
set of forward, put, and call contracts, we restricted the choice to forward and put contracts. But 
this restriction does not prevent the decision maker from creating a written call position. To do so, 
the producer sells forward more than 120,000 pounds and sells puts. The forward contracts in 
excess of 120,000 pounds coupled with the written puts create a written call position that hedges 
against 11 when ()f]j()P2 is positive everywhere (see Figure 3c). This situation occurs when 
l3p = 1, i.e., when the producer perceives price shocks as permanent. 
From Table 1, it can also be seen that 
(i) Q2*- X1*(Z1 = Z1*) > 0 > Z1* when ~F = 0 
(ii) 0 > Z1 * > Q2*- X1 *(Z1 = Z1 *)when ~F = 1 
where [Qz *-XI *(ZI = zl *)] denotes the difference between the optimal myopic hedge (X1 = Qz*) 
and the optimal forward-looking hedge in the presence of puts [X1 *(Z1 = Z1 *)]. Inequalities in (i) 
hold because, for given values of the random variables f and h, ()f]j()P 2 is negative everywhere 
when ~F = 0 [see expression (2.5)]. Hence, the position that offsets ()f]j()P2 must be positively 
sloped with respect to P 2, which is achieved by buying forward contracts 
[Q2*- X1 *(Z1 = Z1 *) > 0]. The explanation of inequalities in (ii) obeys the same logic: ()f]j()P2 is 
positive everywhere when ~F = 1 and ~H < 2; therefore, the decision maker sells additional 
forward contracts [Q2 * - X 1 *(Z1 = Z1 *) < 0]. 
In the simulations reponed, the amount of puts bought is positively related to the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion (A) and negatively related to the elasticity of input demand with respect to 
forward prices (TJIF). Although in unreported simulations both relationships also held for all other 
values of the exogenous variables that were tried, we were unable to prove that they always hold. 
The relationship between Z1 * and TJIF should be negative in most situations because increasing llJF 
increases the convexity of 11 as a function of P 2:14 
(3.5) fiPP = (~F 11Qr Q3 - ~H Iz)2 1ln!(11Qr Fz Q3) 
1
'1-he derivation of (3.5) from (2.6') is available from the authors upon request. 
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The effect of TliF on the convexity of IT is attributable to the fact that IT depends essentially on input 
usage at date 2, and the absolute changes in input usage due to P 2 are larger the larger is the 
elasticity 'llJF· 
Expression (3.5) helps explain the negative (positive) relationship between ~Hand the 
amount of puts bought when l3r: = 0 (~F = 1). When ~F = 0, the convexity of IT is positively 
related to the absolute magnitude of~ (1~1). Intuitively, ~Hi' 0 means that the agent perceives 
future input cash prices (H2) to be associated with future output cash prices (P2). But future 
profits (IT) are a convex function of Hz because of the response of future input use (l:z) to Hz. 
Hence, the larger I~HI, the larger the convexity of IT as a function of P z· For similar reasons, the 
convexity of IT is positively related to the absolute magnitude of ~P given ~H = 0. 
When ~Hand l3r: have the same signs, the effect that P 2 exerts on th~ curvature of IT 
through Hz tends to offset the effect of Pz on the curvature of IT through F2. If~ is positive, the 
producer will tend to reduce I2 (and therefore Q3) as P2 increases. But if ~F is also positive, the 
agent will tend to increase Q3 (and therefore I2) with increases in P 2. These two responses of I2 to 
P 2 work in opposite directions, tending to cancel with each other. The maximum offsetting effect 
occurs when ~H = ~F 11Qr Qytl2, at which fiPP = 0 [see (3.5)]. At this value of ~H· IT is 
approximately a linear function of P2, thus rendering puts unnecessary. This observation makes 
sense, there must be a set of circumstances under which the advantages of forward price increases 
are exactly offset by increases in input costs. In Table 1, the closest scenario to flpp = 0 is when 
~H = 1.5 and ~F = 1, at which the optimal amounts of puts bought are near zero (Z/ ranges 
between -2.3 and -0.8). 
Unreported simulations reveal that the optimal amount of puts purchased is negatively 
related to crp2, and positively related to crF2 and cri. The negative effect in the quantity of puts 
bought caused by an increase in crl outweighs the positive effect due to the same percentage 
increase in crF2 and crH2 Within reasonable bounds, however, the optimal put position does not 
seem very sensitive to changes in the magnitudes of the variances. 
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In Table 1, the column labeled (X1*1 Z1 = 0) shows the optimal forward positions in the 
absence of puts, and the column labeled (X1*1 Z1 = Z1*) reports the optimal forward positions in 
the presence of puts. These two columns reveal that the amount of forward contracts sold when 
puts are available is greater than the amount sold when puts are not available. The explanation of 
this result is that forward contracts are used for two purposes: (i) offsetting the convexity of n, and 
(ii) offsetting the average slope of n. To offset the convexity of n, it is necessary to sell both 
forward and put contracts; but because forward contracts alone are not useful for this purpose, the 
absence of options leads to a net loss in the number of forward contracts sold. In contrast, to 
offset the average slope of n, forward contracts alone are used; therefore, the amount of forward 
contracts employed for this purpose is unaffected by the availability of options. The use of 
forward contracts to offset the average slope of n explains why the amount of forward contracts 
sold is positively associated with ~(given a particular value of 1\J), and negatively related to ~H 
(given a particular value of ~F). From expression (2.5), it can be seen that Clf1/CJP2 (and therefore 
the average slope of m increases with ~p for a given ~H· 
The increase in the amount of forward contracts sold attributable to the availability of puts 
suggests a synergetic effect between the two types of contracts from a hedger's perspective. In 
other words, the scenario analyzed depicts a situation in which puts complement rather than 
compete with forward contracts. The opposite is true if the options available are calls rather than 
puts. That is, in the absence of puts, the decision maker will sell less forward contracts if calls can 
be traded than if calls cannot be traded. Hence, the example is such that calls compete with 
forward contracts. The reason for this result is that the payoff of any position involving the sale of 
x forward contracts andy puts can be replicated by a combination of selling (x- y) forward 
contracts and selling y calls. For example, if calls were available but puts were not, the simulation 
in the first row of Table 1 would involve selling calls for 2,000 pounds and forward contracts for 
91,000 (= 93,000- 2,000) pounds. It can be seen that the amount of forward contracts sold in the 
presence of calls and the absence of puts (91,000 pounds) is less than that sold in the absence of 
options (92,000 pounds). 
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In this example, the producer always sells puts because the simulations assumed decreasing 
returns to scale. Had it been assumed increasing returns to scale, puts would always be purchased 
[see (2.6')]. Decreasing returns to scale is a more realistic assumption, yet the optimality of 
writing puts seems counterintuitive. This result occurs because the producer uses the forward 
market to reduce price risk on the long physical position. Were we to make the forward market 
redundant (instead of the call market), the producer would achieve the exposure depicted in the 
sixth column of Table I by purchasing puts and writing calls to create a synthetic forward position. 
Concluding Remarks 
In a standard one-period (or myopic) model under nonstochastic production and unbiased 
forward and options prices, it is optimal to sell the entire production in the forward market for 
output and to hold a null position in options. Relaxing the restrictive assumption of a single 
production cycle (i.e., allowing for forward-looking behavior), however, will generally change the 
optimal forward position and create a hedging role for options. The reason for the behavioral 
difference between myopic and forward-looking agents is that the latter realize that this period's 
(random) output prices will be associated in a nonlinear manner with prices in subsequent periods. 
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Appendix 
The function g(P2) is continuous and differentiable everywhere except at P2 = F1, at which 
it is continuous but not differentiable if Z1* * 0. Then, according to the Mean-Value Theorem, 
there exists at least one number a in the interval (c, F1) at which 
(Al) '( ) g(F 1)- g(c) g a = F 1 - c 
Denote the set of such numbers by A, i.e., A= {a: a E (c, F1) and g'(a) = [g(F1)- g(c)]/(F1 - c)}. 
Similarly, there exists at least one number in the interval (F1, d) at which 
(A2) g'(b) = g(~ ~ ~(F1) 
1 
Let B = { b: b E (F 1, d) and g'(b) = [g(d) - g(F 1)]/(d- F 1)}, and define the following strictly 
increasing function of P2: 
(A 3) = { inf(A) if P 2 = c < F 1 P- sup(B)IfP 2 =d>F 1 
Because pis a one-to-one mapping of P2, the first derivative of g(P2) with respect to P2 evaluated 
at P2 = p equals 
where rnz" = M2"(P2 = p) and rr' = Clll!CJP2 evaluated at P2 = p. But from (Al) through (A3) we 
also have 
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By substituting (A4) into (AS) and the resulting expression into FOC (2.3) we get 
where: £pp = E1[m2" (F1 - P2)2] 
£PPL = El[ffiz" (Fl- Pz)2 Lz] 
£PPn = EI[mz" (FI- Pz)2 1t'] 
Expression (A6') follows from (A6) because F 1, Q2 *, X1 *, and Z1 * are nonstochastic at date t = 1, 
and F1 = E1 (P 2) if forward prices are unbiased. By proceeding in a similar manner with FOC 
(2.4) we obtain 
(A 7") 
where: £d = E1[g(P2)]- g(F1) 
£PP1tL = El[mz" 1t' (Fl - Pz)2 Lz] 
In deriving (A7'') from (A7') we used the facts that E1[(F1 - P2) L2] = R1 (because put prices are 
assumed to be unbiased) and that Ll = L2 (from the definition of L2). Finally, FOCs (A6') and 
24 
(A 7'') can be combined to yield the following expressions forthe optimal forward and put 
positions: 
(A8) 
£ 
X*=Q*+ PP7t 
1 2 £pp - £PPL 
(A9) 
R 1 £,.. + £PPrtL 
£pp- £PPL 
£pp 
frPL 
It must be true that £pp < £PPL < 0 because~" < 0 (from the assumption that U" < 0) and 
(F 1 - P 2)2 > 0 for P 2 >' F 1. For the same reasons, £PPrt < £PP7tL < 0 if 1t' > 0 everywhere, and 
£PP1t > £PPrtL > 0 if 1t' < 0 everywhere. If 1t' is not either positive or negative everywhere, then the 
signs and relative magnitudes of £PP7t and £PP7tL are ambiguous. Finally, the sign of£,.. is 
ambiguous in general, but it is strictly positive in the most realistic case of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. Hence, barring pathological cases, it will be true that X1* >' Q2* and Z1* * 0. Q.E.D. 
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